Russia
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russiancouncil.ru The Evolution of BRICS and its Role in International Relations
The upcoming summit is already proving itself to be quite interesting; it will be the first meeting between the leaders of major non-Western nations following the recent reprisal against Iran. Although Iran has not acknowledged its defeat, this is essentially a success for the US and its allies, who are effectively implementing a long-term strategy of eliminating the West’s enemies one by one. To some extent, this is also a source of humiliation for BRICS, as it avoided direct involvement in the conflict, even though Iran just became a member of the association last year. Instead, BRICS limited itself to
expressing only “serious concern” along with “encouraging diplomacy and peaceful dialogue.” The upcoming summit is unlikely to change this assessment. The fact that neither Vladimir Putin nor Xi Jinping will be attending Rio downplays the dramatic impact of a gathering of Global South leaders, who are unlikely to challenge the collective West on their own.
Over the past three years, BRICS has undergone radical changes, and there are notions that these changes threaten to reduce the group’s flexibility and capability to address global issues. Due to its increased heterogeneity, there are differing views within the association, including on the Ukrainian conflict and the situation in Gaza. This, albeit indirectly, is even acknowledged at the official level; in June, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
mentioned the contentious issues with other friendly states, although in the context that a balance of interests can always be found. Furthermore, according to
Sergey Ryabkov, “BRICS manages—even despite significant enlargement—to avoid the negative, destructive, detrimental impact of certain bilateral problems that individual BRICS members face in their relations with each other on the overall work of the association.”
Russia maintains the view that the main priority of BRICS development is to use it as an instrument of the global world order, to “score points” in the common cause of weakening the dominance of Western states. Mr. Lavrov
describes BRICS as one of the pillars of the multipolar world, a guide for the interests of the global majority in the international arena, emphasizing that they “are forming mechanisms for conducting foreign trade operations that are independent of the West, laying out new transport and logistics chains, and creating a new architecture for interaction in culture, education, and sports.” In practice, BRICS is perceived more as a platform for settling contradictions and developing a common opinion on global and local issues. From this perspective, the Rio summit, even in the absence of any breakthroughs on the “all-BRICS” topics, is important for resolving specific issues of interaction with the countries of the “Global Southeast.”
This fits quite well into the logic of other countries from the South, which see BRICS primarily as a platform for advancing their own national interests in various situations, rather than defending jointly developed common approaches. At the same time, some new BRICS members are not yet in a position to fully participate in the development of such approaches. However, they are able to slow down or discourage the promotion of certain elements that, for whatever reason, do not suit them. For many BRICS partners from the Global South, the line of external behavior is dictated by their desire to avoid taking sides in the conflict between the collective West and the “revisionists” of international relations (primarily China and Russia). Their goal in partnering with BRICS is to diversify their capabilities, maintain contacts, and influence the decisions of both opposing sides while avoiding support for either. Therefore, with the increasing number of member states and partners, the association is becoming more amorphous, as is evident in the preparations for the current summit. This evolution is more acceptable to the West—some of its scholars
acknowledge that a return to the “neoliberal” order is highly unlikely, but while “multipolar systems may create overlapping rules, competition, and even instability, they also open up space for more pluralism, greater regional interaction, and a higher resilience to failures.”
Political Aspects
The summit will be the first major gathering after the full integration of the new 2024 members, and the temp of their inclusion in the association's activities will differ for each state. The modalities for partners to engage in activities are not yet formalized and the rules have not been established. Much depends on the persistence of the state leaders, their diplomatic experience, as well as their connections with BRICS “founders,” including in the foreign policy and foreign economic apparatus.
As the number of member states continues to grow, questions increasingly arise regarding the principle of consensus decision-making. Some experts question whether the majority principle can be applied in some circumstances, such as Brazil's de facto “veto” of Venezuela's accession to BRICS, while the overwhelming majority did not object to it.
In a world of uncertainty, the defining theme of the summit may be the discussion of measures to change global governance to reflect the realities of a multipolar world, as well as the long overdue reform of the UN, IMF, and World Bank.
During the current chairmanship, the issue of reforming the UN has become particularly acute. Differing approaches of BRICS member states to Security Council reform did not allow members to reach a full consensus on a common position at the BRICS Ministerial Council meeting in April.
Essentially, all BRICS member states agree that the current UN structure (especially the Security Council’s composition) is outdated, reflecting only the realities of 1945 rather than those of the modern world. The main grievances include: unfair representation (Africa, Latin America, and the Muslim world have almost no say in the UN Security Council); veto power abuses by the US, France, and the UK for the sake of promoting individual state interests; and US dollar dominance in the global economy, due to US hegemony in the UN and its institutions, such as the IMF. Russia supports limited enlargement (for example, the inclusion of India and Brazil) but fears that an overly large Security Council would become unwieldy. Formally, China supports reform but implicitly sabotages specific initiatives, as it does not want to share power with new permanent member states (especially with India). India is actively seeking permanent member status in the UN Security Council and has the support of the US, Russia, and France. China, however, proposes creating temporary seats for developing nations instead. Brazil and South Africa want to join the UN Security Council as permanent members but face opposition from the US and EU member states. France supports Brazil, but the US objects, fearing the growing influence of the “Global South.” Within BRICS, Iran and Saudi Arabia have opposing views on the Middle East, which may complicate the formulation of a common policy. Ethiopia and Egypt want to represent Africa in the UN Security Council but are competing with each other, as well as with Nigeria.
The current impasse is largely related to the position of African nations under the so-called Ezulwini Consensus, formulated by the African Union in 2005. Africa demands at least two permanent seats with veto power and five non-permanent seats on an enlarged Security Council. These seats should represent the interests of the entire African continent, with the African Union itself suggesting candidates on a rotating basis. Without directly stating so, current and even prospective permanent UN Security Council members do not consider this approach practical.
Officially, Russia advocates the view that the formation of a multipolar world order implies a larger representation of the Global South and East in the Security Council. Russia supports Brazil and India as worthy candidates for permanent membership in the Security Council, provided “a positive decision regarding representation from the African continent is made.” Naturally, Russia opposes the candidacy of Germany and Japan “due to the revival of militarism in these countries and their overtly unfriendly policies.”
BRICS member states can essentially propose the following options:
- Include India, Brazil, South Africa + 1-2 African countries (though China and the US may veto).
- Propose a new category of members—“semi-permanent” (elected for a long term of 10-15 years with no veto power)—but this will not satisfy the ambitions of India and Brazil.
- Propose alternative structures (for example, a BRICS Council)—a parallel decision-making body that would bypass the West.
The 2025 Rio summit could become a platform for developing a unified position on this matter, given the increasing ineffectiveness of the UN, but the process will be slow and controversial.
As for reforming international financial organizations (IFOs), BRICS member states, including the new arrivals, are known to emphasize the urgency and importance of changing quota distribution to better reflect the relative position of the member states in the global economy, while maintaining the quota shares of developing countries, especially the poorest ones. Many
acknowledge that quota reform, redistributing them in favor of the Global South, “has made no headway... for years and decades.” BRICS does not intend to let this go, though its member states clearly have no leverage to influence the position of Western nations that run the IMF and other financial institutions.
Strengthening cooperation on cyber security and counter-terrorism will also be among the important items on the summit's agenda. The latter topic could also become a stumbling block due to the India-Pakistan conflict, as India accuses Pakistan of terrorism, which is unacceptable to Pakistan’s supporter, China, which will seek to smooth out the wording.
Other security issues will also be discussed (such as crises in the Middle East and North Africa, Ukraine, Africa). Representatives of the Global South, including Latin American and African nations, would prefer a more substantive discussion on national security issues related to the strategic mineral reserves of certain states (e.g. for Bolivia lithium is particularly relevant at this moment).
Current member state approaches to the enlargement issue are more or less uniform—a pause is needed, or BRICS activities will become chaotic. It is necessary to detail the rights and responsibilities of BRICS partners more thoroughly. So far, their interaction with the association has been tentative.
Practical Areas of Cooperation
Measures to establish sustainable payment mechanisms are particularly important for Russia. The summit is likely to make decisions on countering sanctions, including special mechanisms to reduce dependence on Western financial systems. This concerns alternative payment systems—new steps may be taken to develop settlements in national currencies. There are tasks related to the formation of payment instruments, payment platforms, including research on issues such as the creation of a cross-border payment system, an electronic inter-depository interaction system for BRICS (BRICS Clear), and the development of a unified mechanism for exchanging trade and economic information. The discussion may also include the creation of alternative digital platforms (a SWIFT analog for BRICS; the development of CBDC, or central bank digital currencies, for intra-bloc settlements).
Russia believes that the main direction should be the use of national currencies in settlements: in trade and in Russia’s transactions with BRICS member states, the share of the ruble and currencies of friendly countries accounted for 90% by the end of 2024 (the declaration of the Kazan BRICS 2024 summit mentions the Cross-Border Payment Initiative, payment and clearing infrastructure, reinsurance company, and New Investment Platform. These initiatives aim to create favorable conditions for increasing trade and investment turnovers between BRICS nations). Progress towards a common currency or settlement unit for BRICS, which Russia is interested in and has been promoting, is currently stalled due to the skeptical attitudes of most BRICS countries, which are tightly bound to the dollar system.
Measures will be outlined to strengthen the New Development Bank, including for financial infrastructure development. As per tradition, attention will be paid to e-commerce.
Also, the food issue will not go unnoticed; there will be discussions about taking measures to minimize disruptions and promote rule-based trade in agricultural products and fertilizers.
Special attention will be given to ICTs and the digital economy for the sake of bridging the digital divide between developed and developing nations. The focus will be on the development of artificial intelligence (AI), to mitigate risks associated with malicious use, misinformation, confidential information leakages, prejudices, and discrimination. According to Russian industry leaders, the introduction of AI may bring in 2-3 trillion USD to BRICS economies by 2030. The topic of joint research in AI is important (there are expectations that China may propose a common algorithm development platform; India might offer training programs; Russia—solutions in cybersecurity and military applications of AI). The establishment of a working group on AI is quite possible. Countries will also discuss cyber sovereignty issues (for example, common data protection standards—an alternative to the GDPR). In the meantime, conflict between the openness of the internet (India) and its control (China, Russia) remains, along with the technological lag of Africa and Latin America.
In traditional BRICS areas related to ecology and sustainable development, discussions are planned on joint green energy projects, as well as climate policy coordination. Possible initiatives could include the establishment of a BRICS Green Energy fund (financed through the BRICS New Development Bank), promoting a special focus on hydropower (Brazil, Russia), solar energy (India, China, South Africa), wind power (Egypt, UAE), and hydrogen energy development. On the agenda is the integration of energy networks—for example, connecting African countries (South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt) to a unified energy system by using Chinese and Russian technologies. Clearly, competition from Western companies, the application of sanctions against Russian participation, and differing standards among BRICS countries will hinder progress in this matter.
On the climate agenda, which Brazil’s presidency places special importance on, since the COP30 forum will be held there this year, it is likely to promote “climate multipolarity”— that is, different policies pursued by different countries. A common position may be developed regarding demands on the West to increase payments to developing nations (as previous promises have not been kept); creating an alternative fund through the BRICS New Development Bank; protecting the right to fossil fuels; criticizing EU carbon taxes as “neocolonialism,” and proposals for alternative carbon credit schemes (for example, through BRICS). Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China will insist on a gradual phasing out of oil and gas rather than strict bans. Brazil may emphasize the issue of compensation for Amazon conservation. There may be disputes between China and nations advocating for a rapid phase-out of coal, as well as between India and Arab states concerning the pace at which oil is relinquished, among other issues. A unified position at COP30 is desirable (for instance, demanding USD 1 trillion in climate payments from the West), as well as a rejection of unilateral carbon taxes (such as the EU’s CBAM).
Discussions on cultural and scientific cooperation will also take place, although the role of the expert track (such as Academic Forums) has noticeably decreased compared to the initial period of BRICS formation. However, increasing exchanges between universities and research centers, supporting the civil society track and youth initiatives (such as the BRICS Young Diplomats Forum) are on the agenda.